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Understanding the quality of data: a concept map for 
‘the thinking behind the doing’ in scientific practice 
Abstract 
Recent school science curriculum developments in many countries emphasise that 
scientists derive evidence for their claims through different approaches; that such 
practices are bound up with disciplinary knowledge; and that the quality of data 
should be appreciated. This position paper presents an understanding of the validity of 
data as a set of conceptual relationships, illustrating the application of the network of 
ideas and their inter-relationships necessary for the ‘thinking behind the doing’ with 
examples from practice. We explore ways in which this understanding of data is 
inherently related to underpinning disciplinary ideas. We suggest how the recognition 
of a conceptual basis for understanding the quality of data represents an ontological 
shift with respect to widespread characterisations of scientific practices which 
addresses some long-standing issues in science education research, policy, curricula 
and practice. 
 
Introduction 
In many countries science curricula now represent science as including not only ‘the 
products’ of science (the substantive facts, theories and laws, sometimes referred to as 
the content knowledge (e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2013)) but also ‘the processes and characteristics of the 
scientific enterprise’ (Roberts, 2011, p. 12). These developments all share the broad 
aim of Scientific Literacy (Bybee, 1997; DeBoer, 2000; Laugksch, 2000; Roberts, 
1982, 2007). Despite being ‘a rather polysemic expression’ (Martin, 2011, p. 90) a 
common feature is to ‘understand the methods by which science derives the evidence 
for the claims made by scientists, [and] to appreciate the strengths and limits of 
scientific evidence’ (Millar & Osborne, 1998, p. 2004). Large-scale international 
science assessments such as PISA (OECD, 2013) and TIMSS (Jones, Wheeler & 
Centurino, 2013) also reflect this curriculum emphasis (Kind, 2013a). Since DeBoer 
(2011, p. 569) suggests that ‘in some countries … the approach is to match 
educational programs to the framework that is guiding the development of the 
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international assessments’ it is reasonable to assume that attention to ‘the doing of 
science’ as well as the traditional substantive content substantive will become even 
more widespread. 
Over the years, how this ‘doing of science’ has been conceived and expressed in the 
research, policy and assessment literature has differed (Hofstein & Lunetta, 2004; 
Jenkins, 2009; Kind, 2013a; OECD, 2013). For many decades, it was conceived in 
terms of various ‘processes’ to be acquired through practice (Millar & Driver, 1987). 
However, recognition that the ‘doing’ is ‘supported by the integration of science 
concepts and processes, metacognitive processes, critical reasoning skills, and cultural 
aspects of science’ (Cavagnetto, 2010, p. 337; emphasis added) has come to recent 
prominence. Many researchers (e.g., Lederman, et al., 2014; Lubben, Sadeck, Scholtz, 
& Braund, 2010; Roberts & Gott, 2010; Schalk, van der Schee, & Boersma, 2013; 
Tytler, 2007) have moved beyond describing what scientists do (wherein any 
understanding may be implicit) and explicitly articulate some of the ideas required to 
understand evidence since: 
At the core, science is fundamentally about establishing lines of evidence and 
using the evidence to develop and refine explanations using theories, models, 
hypotheses, measurements, and observations. (National Research Council, 
[NRC], 2007, p. 18) 
The PISA 2015 Draft Science Framework (OECD, 2013) addresses the importance of 
evidence in both its ‘procedural knowledge’ and ‘epistemic knowledge’ elements and 
argues that PISA’s 2015 definition [of scientific literacy] represents ‘a more detailed 
specification of particular aspects that were embedded or assumed in earlier 
definitions’ (OECD, 2013, p. 10), thus recognising the importance of making the 
implicit explicit and clarifying the construct for assessment (Wiliam, 2010). 
In the US, the new Framework for K-12 Science Education (NRC, 2012) the 
dimension of ‘Scientific and Engineering practices’ corresponds to understanding 
evidence. The document states that ‘engaging in scientific investigation requires not 
only skill but also knowledge that is specific to each practice’ (p. 31; emphasis added). 
Other recent developments (including Achieve, Inc., 2013; Australian Curriculum, 
Assessment and Reporting Authority, 2012; Department for Education, [DfE], 2014) 
and science education research (e.g., Lederman et al., 2014) give greater emphasis to 
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students being able to understand the diversity of scientific empirical practice; the 
important relationship between substantive knowledge and this ‘doing’ aspect; and the 
importance of students being able to use their understanding to evaluate empirical 
work and reason with evidence as well as being able to carry out practical work. 
Evaluating empirical evidence requires understanding about the validity of data.  This 
understanding represents the ‘thinking behind the doing’ of science. In 1994, Millar, 
Lubben, Gott and Duggan called these ‘concepts of evidence’ and subsequently a 
knowledge base to develop an understanding of empirical evidence has been specified 
(Gott, Duggan, Roberts and Hussain, n.d.). 
Viewing scientific practice as a conceptual knowledge base to be understood rather 
than skills or processes to be acquired represents an ontological shift in its 
characterisation. While recent curriculum documents reflect this shift, since scientific 
practice is concerned with ‘doing’, curriculum specifications tend to describe the 
processes involved and the conceptual basis - important for teaching and assessment -
is not always so explicit. Furthermore, since the process view and its association with 
a single scientific method are so deep rooted in customary school science, as shown 
by Abrahams & Millar (2008), there is the danger that the significance of the 
conceptual shift inherent in the new curriculum documents could be lost if curriculum 
developers, awarding bodies and teachers interpret them from a process perspective. 
Concept maps (Novak & Gowin, 1984) are widely used to represent substantive 
understanding in science (e.g., Johnson & Papageorgiou, 2010; Kinchin, 2010; 
Shymansky et al., 1997). Equally, if ‘the thinking behind the doing’ is also a 
knowledge base of concepts to be understood (rather than ‘processes’ to be routinely 
mastered) it ought to be possible to represent that understanding with a concept map 
(Novak, 2010). A concept map should help to emphasise the difference between an 
underpinning ‘conceptual’ characterisation of scientific practice necessary for 
meaningful learning (Novak & Cañas, 2007) and a surface description of processes. 
This article presents an attempt to produce a concept map for understanding the 
validity of data. 
The map is informed by the concepts of evidence and their inter-relationships (Gott, 
Duggan, Roberts and Hussain, n.d.). The current version has been derived from more 
than a decade of our, and colleagues’, research, teaching and assessment. It has been 
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through many iterations following discussions at both professional and academic 
conferences and has recently been informed by ideas from Cañas, Novak and Reiska 
(2015) with the aim of it having explanatory power, being clear and concise and 
having balance (Kinchin, 2015). 
Our map (Figure 1) centralises the question of the concept of validity of data since 
the degree of confidence in the validity gives it weight as empirical evidence for a 
claim. The network of ideas drawn on in judging the validity of data represents an 
understanding about the quality of data. This understanding is inextricably linked with 
substantive understanding and those concepts directly informed by substantive 
knowledge are highlighted with a shadow on the box. To reiterate, by substantive 
knowledge we include ‘facts’, laws, models and theories of the disciplinary sciences. 
We would suggest that the map as a whole encompasses most if not all of ‘scientific 
practice’ in schools.  
<<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
We have not seen the understanding of evidence being addressed through a concept 
map in the literature and believe this offers a valuable perspective for science 
education. The map of the conceptual relationships helps to highlight important points 
that are not always so easy to communicate to a wider audience more attuned to a 
process view. As a concept map, it is important to distinguish it from a flow diagram; 
it does not represent any particular procedure or approach. The map is structured from 
the perspective of carrying out an investigation i.e. data is being collected to answer a 
question. 
In this article, firstly, we will explain the meaning of the terms and propositions in our 
map, using examples to illustrate how the ideas and their relationships are applied in 
the ‘thinking behind the doing’. The map does not represent the processes but shows 
the thinking – the ideas and their inter-relationships - behind decisions; so we give 
examples from different areas of science to exemplify the application of the ideas as 
they inform practice. Since the arrows are not processes, but are conceptual links, 
there is not necessarily any one starting point or direction of travel in practice. 
However, for convenience in our explanation we will work systematically through the 
map. After examining its detail we go on to consider some important general points 
which emerge from the map as a whole with respect to the nature of science, the 
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notion of ‘scientific method’ and the relationship between substantive theory and 
scientific practice. Finally we address how the ontological shift in the characterisation 
of scientific practice from routine process to conceptual understanding has 
implications for practical work in schools.  
A concept map for understanding the validity of data 
We will explain our map with particular reference to two contrasting investigations; 
called Springboard (Figure 2) and Shrimp (Figure 3). These investigations allow us to 
discuss the understanding represented by the whole map. We recognise that some 
scientific practices may only focus on specific regions.  
<<INSERT FIGs 2 + 3 ABOUT HERE>>  
Broadly speaking, Figure 1 has two inter-related sides. On the left is thinking about 
variables and on the right thinking about measurement. We will start with variables. 
Variables 
All investigations involve defined variables. These variables are the creation of 
existing substantive knowledge - they constitute the disciplines biology, chemistry, 
physics, earth science etc. Scientific observation is dependent on ‘seeing the world’ 
through science’s ‘conceptual spectacles’. As Lederman et al. (2014, p. 68) state, 
investigators ‘need to have specific knowledge that has been melded into some 
curious pattern or question’. Any limitations in understanding of pertinent substantive 
ideas affects what can be observed (Haigh, France, & Gounder, 2012). 
Variables can be categoric, where the value is descriptive (e.g. a material or species) 
or continuous, where the value lies on a numeric scale. (e.g. length, temperature). 
Although rooted in the scientific conceptualisation of our world, the variables of 
Springboard do not draw on specialised knowledge. With regard to load, there is no 
need to distinguish between mass and weight, and distance is part of everyday 
thinking. Explanations may use ideas relating to force and motion, but that is another 
matter (see later). Shrimp draws more directly on scientific knowledge. It involves the 
identification of freshwater shrimp Gammarus pulex (a genus of freshwater amphipod 
crustacean) and other variables such as water speed, pH and oxygen concentration. 
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Variables may have a relationship with each other. For Springboard we could ask 
how the height reached by the toy figure is related to the load. For Shrimp we could 
wonder where shrimp like to live. The decision to look for a relationship derives from 
existing knowledge. With Springboard, a hunch based on everyday play experiences 
may be the basis for the question, though the expectation of a specific relationship is 
of itself scientific. Shrimp stems from the substantive idea of different species 
requiring different ecological conditions. 
The supposition of a relationship implies that a change in one variable corresponds to 
change in the other. For convenience the two variables in focus can be called the 
independent (IV) and dependent variables (DV) respectively
i
. As will be discussed 
later, the assignment of the DV and IV labels does not necessarily presume a causal 
link. However, confounding variables are other variables which are thought to affect 
the DV. So, the identification of confounding variables absolutely draws directly on 
substantive knowledge and is limited by that knowledge. There has to be a reason for 
deciding upon a particular variable, if only because it might be relevant. Confounding 
variables must be controlled in some way to isolate any relationship between the 
chosen IV and DV. 
For a continuous IV decisions about the range and interval of their values have to 
be made. The range is crucial in capturing the full picture of any relationship. 
Substantive theory can inform the thinking, but trial runs will be needed to explore a 
suitable range in the circumstances. Interval can also be important, especially where 
closer readings are helpful in picking up any maximum, minimum or inflection points. 
Decisions about intervals of the IV can also be made iteratively, in response to the 
data gathered, with an eye on any emergent pattern. Again, substantive thinking can 
lead to the anticipation of such eventualities. The idea of range can also apply to a 
categoric independent variable; for example, in a question exploring a property of 
materials one would need to decide how many different materials to test. 
For Springboard, height reached is the DV and load is the IV. Confounding 
variables include: material of ruler, dimensions of ruler, overhang, clamping position, 
position of figure on ruler, position of mass, mass of figure, dimensions and shape of 
figure, mass of string, temperature, air movements. All of these confounding variables 
can be directly manipulated and each fixed at a certain value. Some are more 
important than others. The length of overhang is a critical variable while it might be 
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assumed that any small fluctuations in temperature will have negligible effect and 
might not be given special attention. For those variables to be fixed, what should their 
values be? Decisions about one cannot be made without reference to others and 
determining their impact on the DV. The values need to be chosen appropriately. Too 
small an overhang and/or too heavy a toy figure may not produce a measurable height 
reached for the range of available loads. Trials to establish a range for the IV must be 
in conjunction with exploring fixed values for the CVs in relation to the impact on the 
DV. In some contexts, a confounding variable is manipulated not by fixing to a 
certain value, but by ensuring any fluctuations are the same across different values of 
the IV. This is often seen in the setting up of a ‘control’ in biological contexts. 
For Shrimp, the number of shrimps in an area is the DV. Variables which might affect 
the DV would include: pollution, aquatic vegetation, pH, velocity, oxygen in water, 
substrate type, substrate size, depth, surrounding and upstream vegetation, other 
animals, time of day and time of year. While selection of time of day and time of year 
are under the control of the investigator, for the others in the natural context it is not 
possible to isolate one variable from another and the values cannot be directly 
manipulated. (This could only be done by lab-based modelling of the stream; as 
illustrated for ponds by Lehrer, Schauble, & Lucas, 2008). Data from variables that 
cannot be manipulated are sometimes referred to as observational data (e.g., Gray, 
2014). Identifying all relevant variables depends on substantive knowledge as does 
the recognition that some of these variables may be co-variables (i.e. oxygen 
concentration and substrate size are both related to velocity). 
In a survey like Shrimp the approach is to collect data on all of the variables at as 
many different sites as seems reasonable (based on substantive understanding) or on 
some systematic basis or as is possible in practice. Post-hoc comparisons can then be 
made. Hodson (2014) points out, that such ‘data mining’ is now more common across 
experimental science. Firstly, co-variation can be examined and if confirmed these 
can be treated ‘as one’. Different variables can then be considered in turn as the IV 
with the others as confounding variables being matched by selection of sites where 
values are similar. For instance, the relationship between velocity and shrimp 
numbers could be determined at sites matched by selection of, for example, the 
‘absent’ values for the variables pollution and aquatic vegetation i.e. at sites where 
there was no pollution and no macroscopic plants growing.  
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The naturally occurring values of any independent variable have to be chosen (rather 
than actively changed) to capture the natural range of any IV considered in the stream 
and the range would need to be considered too in relation to the magnitude of any 
effect which will become clearer during data collection. Site selections for the values 
of the IV could be random, or they could be selected and consider as stratified 
(encompassing the range of velocities, say). As measurements are taken throughout 
the stream, the investigator would have to consider whether enough intervals for any 
variable considered as an IV had been measured to identify any potential pattern.  
Measurement 
Variables have values, categoric or continuous, all of which require measurement by 
an instrument of some kind. For continuous variables, apart from a ruler to measure 
distance, most if not all instruments rely on previously established relationships 
between variables and are therefore products of existing substantive knowledge. For 
example, common thermometers presume a linear thermal expansion of mercury or 
alcohol.  
All measuring instruments have a built-in degree of uncertainty – the recorded 
values of all variables are approximations. Foremost, in a school context, when 
measuring continuous values is the resolution of the scale. In the case of a ruler 
marked out in one mm intervals, it is possible to read to the nearest 0.5 mm (or even 
smaller) with high confidence. For a digital instrument such as a top-pan balance 
giving a readout to the nearest 0.1 g, for a value recorded as 5.0 g we can only be sure 
we have a mass somewhere between 4.95 g and 5.05 g. High level work would need 
to take the detailed specification of an instrument into account. For example, a 
thermometer has an error associated with the consistency of the bore’s cross-sectional 
area and a certain depth of immersion is stipulated. Ideally, one chooses an instrument 
where the magnitude of the uncertainty is small in proportion to the value being 
measured.  
Our definition of an instrument also includes the totality of how it is used to measure 
a particular variable. For Springboard one instrument for measuring height reached 
could be ‘using a metre rule and sighting by eye’ and another could be ‘a metre rule 
and recording by video’. The former would have a greater degree of uncertainty 
associated with judging the highest point of the trajectory. In Shrimp, the instrument 
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for measuring the number of shrimp is ‘kick sampling’ii. The number of netted shrimp 
can be carefully counted, but there will be uncertainty about the precise area disturbed, 
the proportion of shrimp dislodged and the proportion of those actually caught in the 
net. 
An instrument, then, can only measure a continuous variable to a region (not a point) 
and its accuracy relates to how close that region is to the true value. For an accurate 
measurement, we would expect the true value to lie within the region. A systematic 
error can arise if the scale is not calibrated correctly. 
Sometimes it is not possible to measure a variable directly and a proxy is used 
instead
iii
. For Shrimp, the most relevant water speed will be that at the bottom. 
However, without very sophisticated instruments this will be difficult to measure. 
Instead, a pragmatic decision may be made to measure ‘water speed at the surface’. 
How well this substitute stands in will be open to debate.  
The concept of measurement (although often referred to as ‘observation’; see, for 
instance Gray, 2014) can also be applied to a categoric variable, where qualitative 
descriptions are the values. Here, the measurement entails the recognition of the 
defining features of the variable, with the substantively-informed discernment of the 
observer acting like an instrument. Our Shrimp investigation rests on the capacity to 
distinguish G. pulex from other creatures. There may be uncertainty with some 
specimens. Placing vegetation into different categories will also require judgment
iv
. 
Reliability of the DV 
With a single measurement of the DV, we only know an approximate value of the DV 
for what will also be approximate values of the IV and CVs. In many cases, this is all 
that is possible and the quality of the data and patterns will be judged with recourse to 
the ideas below but without being able to apply them empirically. Where the other 
variables are readily manipulated, the reliability of the DV can be assessed by 
repeated ‘takes’. Here, the degree of uncertainty associated with each instrument of 
the investigation makes a combined impact on each value of the DV measured. In 
setting up for each take, the starting conditions will only be the same within the limits 
of the instruments and differences may result in a different value of the DV being 
recorded (subject to the uncertainty of the DV instrument). 
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For Springboard, the important variables such as overhang, load and toy figure can be 
left unchanged between ‘takes’ and perhaps only the position of the toy figure might 
vary slightly giving differences in trajectory. Other experiments may require more re-
measuring out of quantities in setting up each time.  
However, the reliability of the DV will also depend on what we call the repeatability 
of the event. By this we mean the extent to which all other confounding variables 
have been identified and controlled. For Springboard, we may not have thought about 
the cutting of the string. It will be important to have a sharp pair of scissors since any 
snagging or pulling on the string will affect how bent the ruler is on point of release. 
Although identified, we may not have been able to control for air currents. As noted 
earlier, the identification of confounding variables is as good as our substantive 
understanding of the situation. 
Increasing the number of repeats, if possible, narrows down the region where we can 
say the true value of the DV lies (for each value of the IV in a region according to its 
measurement). Statistically speaking, increasing the number of repeats reduces the 
standard deviation of the mean, otherwise known as standard error (SE = SD/√n). We 
can be 68% confident that the true value lies in the region between one SE either side 
of the experimental mean value. Extending the region to two SE either side of the 
experimental mean gives a 95% probability of covering the location of the true value. 
What constitutes a good enough reliability is a matter of judgment in the 
circumstances. The key issue here is how the SE of the DV compares to the 
magnitude of any change over the range of the IV, since this will determine the extent 
to which any intrinsic relationship can emerge
v
. Trial runs to get a sense of the 
variation in the data and the magnitude of the effect of changing the IV are 
essential to the planning stage of an investigation. If the variation (SD) is very small 
in comparison to the change with IV then relatively few repeats are necessary to give 
a good enough SE. (With a few repeats its computation would not be appropriate, in 
practice.) If the variation (SD) is large in comparison to the effect of changing the IV 
one should first think about ways of reducing the variation - better instruments and/or 
thinking again about possible confounding variables and their control. Failing that, if 
feasible, the number of repeats will need to be increased until the SE is small enough 
to reach a conclusion. Substantive understanding of the various factors will inform the 
best course of action. For Springboard, the uncertainty in judging the highest point by 
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eye will most likely be the biggest contributor to the variation and the use of video 
technology would be worthwhile. If not available, since the time for a take is 
relatively short, a large number of repeats is feasible. 
We have focussed on the reliability of the DV, but the need for repeated 
measurements can also apply to other variables. For example, in Shrimp, the velocity 
at the surface can be measured by timing a floating object (such as a ball) travelling a 
fixed distance downstream, such as one metre. However, since the movement of the 
object will be affected by inconsistencies of wind and eddies a number of repeats will 
be necessary to establish the variation and a good enough mean for comparison with 
other sites. 
Repeated measurements of a variable are not always practicable or even possible and 
any assumptions must always be acknowledged in the interpretation of the data. The 
disruptive kick sampling in Shrimp prohibits repeated readings of the DV in the same 
spot on the same occasion. One way round this would be to sample in adjacent sites 
where conditions are similar. Another would be to return at a later date after the 
stream has had the chance to settle down (if the different time of year was not an 
issue). Collecting data from other streams (with similar key characteristics) would 
also be useful. The aim is to collect as much relevant data as possible (subject to 
ethical constraints). By having many sites the intervals of all IVs would most likely be 
smaller, which would also help to better establish any pattern in the data. As with 
shrimp numbers and water velocity, if the effect of changing the IV is greater than the 
variation, a scatter plot will indicate a trend and the strength in the relationship can be 
quantified through the use of statistics such as the correlation coefficient and its 
probability. 
Before completing our consideration of reliability, we must mention ‘human error’ 
which for reasons given below, is excluded from the map.  
Human Error 
We have noted the constraints of our sense organs when incorporated into an 
instrument (e.g. judging highest point of flight or accurate identification of 
specimens). However, that people can be sloppy and make mistakes is self-evident. 
That there is an inherent variation in the measurement of a DV, no matter how 
carefully done, is the crucial point to understand. It can then be appreciated how very 
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tightly manipulated contexts can lead to little variation (or no variation that can be 
picked up by our instruments). Too much emphasis on ‘anomalous’ readings arising 
from ‘human error’ carries the danger of offering an easy distraction – sliding to all 
variation being put down to human error (Fairbrother & Hackling, 1997). 
Variables that are objects 
Returning to the left side of the map, where an object is involved in an investigation, 
we must consider the variation amongst objects of that type. For living things, 
sizeable variation between individuals in their behaviour is to be expected and needs 
to be considered. In our Shrimp survey, we assume that we find enough shrimp to 
have a representative sample of the species. A reason to count the shrimp at a large 
number of sites is to increase the number sampled. In a lab-based modelling of the 
stream, we would need to decide on a number of shrimp to use – we could not go on 
the behaviour of one shrimp. Similarly, an investigation to establish the effect of 
different fertilizers on the yield of tomatoes will need more than a few tomato plants. 
What constitutes a good enough number of specimens (sample size) will depend on 
the variation in the data in comparison to the magnitude of the effect on changing 
the IV (as with deciding on the number of DV repeats). For the lab-based stream 
model, the variation relates to how the numbers at each site change as shrimp move 
about. For the tomato investigation, the variation will be in the yield per plant. 
Social science and medical studies will select groups through a screening process on 
confounding variables. If a ‘male middle class smoker and drinker’ is put in the 
treatment group, then a matched ‘male middle class smoker and drinker’ is also put 
in the comparison (control) group. Of course, what counts as ‘male’, ‘middle class’, 
‘smoker’ and ‘drinker’ will need to be defined. If sample groups are large enough one 
can move into the territory of a randomised controlled trial (RCT). Subjects are 
assigned to treatment groups by a random process. With a large enough sample size 
it can be assumed the multifarious confounding variables will even out so the only 
difference overall is the treatment applied to one group and not the other. 
For objects manufactured under tight quality control we expect little variation in their 
characteristics and a small sample, if not just one specimen, is often assumed to be 
representative. In the case of Springboard, presuming no significant wear and tear, we 
would expect any relationship found for one ruler to apply to all rulers of that type. 
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Our investigation would not involve testing lots of the same type of ruler. In 
chemistry, the objects are ‘substances’ where we expect no variation within a type but 
where the purity of a sample is an important issue. 
Peer review 
We have introduced our map from the perspective of the investigator. The ideas 
relating to variables and measurement are equally important from the perspective of 
others. The first consideration in the evaluation of any claim, be that by peer review 
(both before and after publication) or, less formally, by any sceptical person, is the 
validity of any presented data. Sufficient information must be known about the 
circumstances with respect to variables under which the data were generated and the 
reliability of measurements in order to judge the quality of the data and the limits of a 
claim. In the UK, the Royal Society’s motto ‘“Nullius in verba” which roughly 
translates as “take nobody’s word for it” … is an expression of the determination … 
to verify all statements by an appeal to facts determined by experiment’ vi(n.d.). The 
specific claim from any empirical work should reflect the decisions made in the 
application of the understanding shown in the map and the confidence in the pattern. 
Once data are judged good enough to reveal a distinct pattern, there is then the issue 
of its interpretation. Explanations and the appropriateness of any generalisations 
beyond the data will draw on existing knowledge and theory. The relationship 
between evidence and explanation takes us into the complex area of the philosophy of 
science which our map does not expand upon. In the next section we confine 
ourselves to a few key points relevant to school science that ensue from linking 
evidence back to existing substantive theory  
Discussion 
As noted earlier, we suggest that the recognition of a conceptual basis for 
understanding the quality of data represents an ontological shift with respect to 
widespread characterisations of scientific practices. We would argue that this has 
implications for addressing some long-standing issues in science education research, 
policy, curricula and practice. 
Our map focuses on the ideas involved in carrying out a scientific investigation or 
inquiry from initial observation to judging the quality of the data, and firstly we turn 
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to how this understanding underpins the resultant claim and its position in the broader 
substantive theory. This is important for an understanding about the nature of science 
(NOS). 
Evidence and explanation 
Causality 
Where a relationship is found, it could be causal, an association or pure chance. 
Acceptance of causality depends on there being a mechanism from established 
substantive theory that explains how one isolated variable could cause the change in 
another. In the case of the Springboard, there is little doubt that the ruler is directly 
causing the figure to fly upwards and that a greater distortion (load) gives a greater 
height reached. In Shrimp, the distribution of Gammarus does change with the water 
velocity but the latter is not thought to be directly caused by the former. Here, the 
explanation relates to the co-variation of velocity with dissolved oxygen 
concentrations, substrate size and available food. The relationship between water 
velocity and shrimp numbers is an association. The almost perfect correlation between 
margarine consumption and divorce rate in the US state of Maine (Fletcher, 2014) 
would appear to arise by pure chance. 
Prediction and retrodiction 
Perhaps the defining characteristic of scientific theory is the way it responds to new 
evidence and moreover how it enables predictions (hypotheses) to be made, which in 
turn may be tested by experimentation. If valid (as far as can be judged) data do not 
agree with the prediction, some accommodation in the theory is needed, which could 
range from amendment to abandonment. In the case with some examples from the 
‘historical sciences’ (Gray, 2014) where testing is not possible (other than by 
modelling), the ‘prediction’ or ‘retrodiction’ can be about other instances of the 
phenomenon that has already occurred or other lines of evidence:  
Retrodiction … is the process of inferring the past from the present... Darwin, 
for example, retrodicted that many intermediate forms of life would be found 
in the fossil record … Similarly, cosmologists were able to retrodict from the 
big bang theory the existence of cosmic microwave background radiation 
(Gray, 2014, p. 333). 
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Competing theories 
Sometimes the connection between variables can be determined empirically but the 
relationship could be explained by very different theories. For instance, that the time 
for a candle to extinguish within an upturned jar depends on the volume of contained 
air is readily demonstrated. However, in the late 18
th
 Century, proponents of the 
established phlogiston theory and the newly proposed oxygen theory disputed the 
explanation. The eventual acceptance of the oxygen theory occurred after a body of 
evidence, from different empirical works, accumulated and, following judgement by 
peers, was considered to be the most parsimonious explanation consistent with the 
evidence. Here the combustion of hydrogen to give water as the only product was 
decisive (Conant, 1957). Scientific theories are tentative and underdetermined by the 
evidence (Jimenez-Aleixandre, Rodriguez & Duschl, 2000; Lederman et al., 2014). 
Overall, it is important to appreciate that theory is not evidence. However, a person’s 
theoretical persuasion has a strong influence on what is sought and accepted as 
evidence. There is the danger that poor data are accepted uncritically because they fit 
with expectations and sound data are dismissed on superficial grounds because they 
don’t. Such influences are at play in peer review and political circles, as well as in 
science classrooms (which we discuss further below). 
There is no single scientific method 
The concept map represents an understanding of the validity of data and contains no 
ordered series of procedures or processes. It is not a flow diagram of the sort that is 
often associated with descriptions of scientific ‘chains of practice’ (Kinchin & Hay, 
2007). The arrow directions in conjunction with the linking terms are there to 
represent the propositional relationships which give meaning to the concepts and do 
not imply a procedural sequence. To reiterate, this is a map of the ‘thinking behind the 
doing’, whatever form the ‘doing’ might take (Roberts & Gott, 2003). The conceptual 
overview represents a network of intricately linked ideas, and decisions when 
investigating are based on nuanced application of these ideas, involving mental 
juggling as juxtapositions and contingencies are considered according to context. In 
terms of validity, there is no distinction between approaches (such as an ‘experimental 
approach’ or an ‘observational approach’) to finding patterns in data (Cleland, 2002). 
No one approach is privileged over another; the key issue is what is appropriate 
16 
 
depending on the circumstances, as illustrated by Springboard and Shrimp. Of itself, 
the map embodies the realisation that ‘there is no single set or sequence of steps 
followed in all investigations’ (Lederman, et al., 2014, p. 68). 
Understanding of the ideas in the map is demonstrated in practice during trials or 
iterative working; the ‘thinking behind the doing’ becomes evident. As noted earlier, 
trials are conducted prior to main data collection and are important to determine the 
range and interval of the IV, the means of control for confounding variables, and how 
best to deal with any variation in the data to see if a pattern can be distinguished. The 
investigator tends to work more iteratively at the start of an investigation and then 
more linearly once the quality of the data has been established, although decisions 
about anomalous data, the size of the sample or number of repeats cannot be pre-
determined and must be considered, in relation to the data collected and whether it is 
good enough for the claim, throughout the whole investigation. Investigation, as 
Hodson (2014, p. 13) states ‘is an organic, dynamic, interactive activity, a constant 
interplay of thought and action’. This explains how different investigators, even if 
approaching a problem in a similar way, may make different justified decisions in 
response to the ideas – reflecting their ‘constraining assumptions’ (Fortus, 2009, p. 
86) - with concomitant effects on their data. 
The inter-play of these ideas in relation to context is illustrated by different 
approaches to repeating readings (Heinicke & Heering, 2013). In Springboard the 
reliability of the data, requires sufficient repeated measurements to ‘capture’ the 
variation and give a small enough standard error. However, in circumstances where 
the event is highly repeatable and specialised instruments have a very small degree of 
uncertainty, repeating until the same measured value occurs consistently (say, twice) 
is a sensible approach (e.g. many titrations in chemistry). Any small differences 
between repeated readings can be ascribed to ‘operator error’ and in such 
circumstances practicing the technique leads to consistency. The latter approach 
corresponds to what Buffler, Allie, Lubben and Campbell (2001) term as ‘point 
reasoning’, but we must be careful about classifying this as a general misconception 
about repeated readings – all depends on the context. 
Of course, the formal write up of an investigation may not reflect the iterative 
working and may just give a linear account, reporting the conditions under which the 
data were collected without the background story of the preparatory trialling. In this 
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sense the conventions of formal write ups, although an efficient means of 
communication, taken at face value, misrepresent scientific practice. 
Substantive knowledge and scientific practice are inseparable  
The map emphasises the intimate integration of substantive knowledge (the shadowed 
concept boxes) with scientific practice. Neither stands alone, each is only as good as 
the other. The production of data is conceived within, is guided by and uses 
instruments that depend on existing substantive knowledge. The soundness of 
substantive knowledge depends on the quality of the originating data as evidence. We 
have already touched on the relationship between theory and evidence. Student 
engagement in interpretation, evaluation and argumentation has been strongly 
advocated in recent research literature (Kuhn, 1993; Lubben et al., 2010). However, 
the argumentation research tends to focus on the fit between theory and evidence 
without examining the quality of data behind the ‘evidence’ (Gott & Duggan, 2007). 
Although this allows students to learn about argumentation per se it provides little 
opportunity for them to engage with the ideas in the map. For example, in a socio-
scientific context about the funding of a zoo (Osborne, Erduran & Simon, 2004, p. 
1009) the information furnished for the argument is that: 
… ‘some animals wouldn’t be able to breed in the wild’ and there is a 
warrant supplied that this is because ‘they may not have enough food.’ 
This claim is further supported or elaborated by the claim that ‘the 
animals need a safe place to live’ and the data to support this claim are 
that otherwise ‘they will be at risk from predators’. 
All of the claims are accepted without evidence to support these assertions. Even 
when empirical data are provided, activities that focus on students’ reasoning and 
their use of evidence (rather than opinion or inference) to support explanations may 
not provide opportunities for the quality of the data to be questioned. For instance, in 
detailed work by Berland and Reiser (2009) students’ arguments about population 
numbers were deemed to be more persuasive when they included statements like 
‘research showed’, suggesting some acceptance of the authority of the research and 
the quality of the data presented seemed not to be questioned. 
Duschl and Osborne (2002, p. 55) note that ‘the challenge is to provide teachers and 
students with tools that help them build on nascent forms of student argumentation to 
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develop more sophisticated forms of scientific discourse’. We would suggest that the 
ideas about the quality of data are indispensable and that the whole of our map is 
addressed across argumentation activities. These tools move towards giving students 
the means to evaluate ‘the goodness, the normative status, or epistemic forcefulness of 
candidate reasoning for belief, judgement, and action’ (Siegel, 1995, p. 162, emphasis 
in original) and are therefore important in both the construction and critique of claims 
(Ford & Foreman, 2006). 
Overall, the appreciation of ideas about the quality of data and the relationship 
between substantive knowledge and scientific practice lie at the heart of 
understanding about the nature of science (NOS). The specification of what might be 
appropriate at school level is under debate (see for instance Abd-El-Khalick, 2012; 
Hodson & Wong, 2014). There is no space to enter into this debate here but we 
suggest that an understanding of our map would go a long way towards a desirable 
understanding of the NOS; a contention seemingly supported by Kind’s (2013b) 
analysis of NEAP, PISA and TIMSS science assessment scales. Indeed, as well as 
informing curriculum developers and awarding bodies, we believe the map would 
serve as a useful instrument for teachers when developing students’ epistemic 
understanding about scientific knowledge. Here, reference to the history of science 
can help to illustrate the interaction of scientific knowledge with scientific practice. 
For example, early work on the volumes of gases did not identify temperature and 
pressure as confounding variables (Conant, 1957). A current example where we are as 
uncertain about the phenomena as our predecessors were is whether data are good 
enough evidence for the existence of gravity waves or better explained by space dust 
(Cowen, 2014). 
Implications for the role of practical work in science 
education 
Viewing scientific practice as a network of ideas to be understood has significant 
implications for the role of practical work in science education, its specification in 
curricula and its assessment (Roberts & Gott, 2006). By practical work we mean 
activities where students engage with materials and apparatus and make qualitative 
observations and/or quantitative measurements (after Abrahams and Millar’s (2008) 
definition). There will still be the need to develop manual skills and awareness of 
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techniques, and for the customary illustrative-type practicals that teachers are familiar 
with. The purpose of illustrative practicals is to acquaint students with the variables 
science uses to describe the world and so support the learning of substantive 
knowledge and theory. Students need to learn how to recognise objects (for example, 
plant and animal cells when viewing suitably prepared samples through a microscope) 
or to recognise phenomena (such as dissolving or boiling). Illustrative practicals also 
exemplify known relationships between variables. To ensure the intended outcome, 
these can be presented to students as a ‘recipe’ wherein all the decisions about the 
design to establish a valid pattern have already been made. In the physical sciences, 
matters can be contrived to give a small variation in comparison to the effect of 
changing the IV so that only a few repeated measurements of the DV suffices (three, 
at most, will do). In biological contexts, where variation is inherent, collection of 
large datasets - often by many students pooling their results - is often needed to 
illustrate a relationship unambiguously. 
Of course, in a recipe-type practical teachers can make a point of analysing the 
reasoning behind the design, but the first priority is developing the substantive 
understanding and one must be mindful of overloading students. In contrast to 
illustrative practicals there is also the need for activities aimed at developing students’ 
understanding of the quality of data; i.e. the ideas in our map. This will involve 
students carrying out their own scientific investigations so that they can make their 
own decisions, applying their understanding of the ideas on the map. In the first 
instance, we would suggest that teachers choose contexts which do not make high 
demands on specialised substantive understanding and where the outcome is not part 
of prescribed disciplinary content, better still if the outcome is genuinely unknown. 
This allows the focus to be on getting good enough data to tell us something and not 
agreement with a ‘right answer’ (Allen, 2011) – a practice that can give a false 
impression of science (Driver, Newton & Osborne, 2000). Springboard is a good 
example, which can be extended by adopting it as a measuring instrument to address 
issues of calibration. Freed from substantive content imperatives, a wide range of 
imaginative contexts with appeal to students are possible: for example, investigating 
the relationship between the spins of an egg and the length of boiling time (see Gott, 
Foulds, Roberts, Jones & Johnson, 1999). Demonstration of an understanding of the 
interaction amongst the ideas in the map is seen when students carry out trials and 
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work iteratively in response to the data – making nuanced decisions as they work – 
which are not features common to illustrative practicals. Shrimp provides 
opportunities for many different decisions not encountered in most lab-based contexts, 
thus providing an opportunity for students to develop an understanding of evidence in 
‘naughty world’ contexts where data is ‘messy’ (Lambert & Reiss, 2014). 
Since ideas about the quality of data have not been explicitly and systematically 
addressed in customary school science (Abrahams & Reiss, 2012), we have little 
empirically-derived data on how students take to them and how a progression in 
scientific investigation might look. However, we can identify features of an 
investigation which, from our experience, affects the demand in applying the ideas. A 
continuous IV entails more decision making than a categoric IV. A reliable DV is 
easier to deal with than a wayward one. Large changes in the DV and especially in 
conjunction with high reliability make for a less demanding decision on the number of 
repeats (i.e. again, the typical 3 may well do). Situations where confounding variables 
need to be matched are more challenging than those where they can be manipulated. 
Sampling of objects with significant variation within their kind brings an additional 
consideration. How such features of an investigation combine to give an overall 
difficulty is an empirical question. Even if non-specialised, the substantive context 
will also be a major factor and it seems likely that a graduated bank of investigations 
will need to be built up through a case law approach. Of course, in practice, the 
overall difficulty of an investigation activity can be adjusted by how many decisions 
are left open to the students. Since the focus is on learning ideas, non-practical 
teaching activities will also be appropriate; in our experience, explicit teaching of 
ideas from distinct sections of the map, with ample opportunities for students to 
discuss the effects of potential decisions in relation to real data and the quality of 
claims (their own or others’) is valuable. 
Once students comprehend ideas about the quality of data, as their substantive 
knowledge develops they should be able to conduct profitable investigations in 
increasingly more specialised scientific contexts, thereby consolidating their 
substantive and quality of data understandings in conjunction. This could be seen to 
be moving towards the goals of inquiry-based learning (Minner, Levy & Century, 
2010) and indeed with good enough data students should be able to find out certain 
relationships between variables for themselves. However, we must emphasise that 
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investigative success is contingent upon already established understanding about the 
quality of data and sufficient substantive understanding to allow its realisation in 
context (Glaesser, Gott, Roberts & Cooper, 2009). We concur with Hodson (2014) 
that inquiry-based learning cannot be the principal method for teaching substantive 
knowledge. Carefully thought through illustrative practical work is needed to support 
the development of important substantive ideas. Here we must acknowledge that 
research casts doubt upon the value of much practical work in developing substantive 
understanding (Abrahams & Millar, 2008; Abrahams & Reiss, 2012). However, it 
seems logical that first-hand experiences of phenomena ought to support learning and 
we suggest their apparent ineffectiveness calls for a rethink of many traditional 
activities, informed by the research into students’ substantive understanding (Johnson 
& Tymms, 2011). It is also important to appreciate that many students will not ‘pick 
up’ ideas relating to the quality of data simply by following numerous ‘recipes’ (Gott 
& Duggan, 1996). The ideas need direct teaching with a combination of illustrative 
activities (practical and non-practical, as with substantive ideas), and whole and part 
investigations where students consider the interplay between the ideas in decision 
making (see, for instance, Campbell, 2010; Roberts, 2004). Once students have 
developed this basic understanding in different contexts they will, arguably, be in a 
better position to understand the diverse practices and conventions employed across 
the sciences (Hodson & Wong, 2014). 
In short, teachers must be very clear about the purposes of any particular practical 
activity (Abrahams & Millar, 2008), which should be more than a way of appeasing 
students. 
Conclusion 
The focus on understanding evidence in recent curriculum documents represents an 
ontological shift in the characterisation of scientific practice; it is not compatible with 
a process view with its focus on ‘doing’ certain skills and processes, and therein lies 
the danger to its realisation. If the teaching of scientific practice continues to be 
viewed as associated with processes, the conceptual basis for understanding evidence 
- the core ideas and their relationships which are shown on the concept map – will be 
misrepresented and will be lost in curriculum implementation. The ideas of evidence 
will not be at the explicit heart of teaching and assessment of scientific practice. 
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Deep-rooted customs in school science practice, with its association with a single 
scientific method, may result in readers of curriculum documents interpreting them in 
old ways. We would venture to warn that without the ontological shift exemplified 
here, little may change in practice despite everyone’s best intentions.  
Our map has gone through many iterations and we make no claims about the version 
presented here. Its main purpose is in its being a concept map and so emphasising that 
scientific practice is about ideas to be understood and that can be specified – just like 
substantive knowledge – and that its teaching should follow accordingly so as to 
develop learners’ understanding of the relationships expressed in the map. 
The map emphasises that science is a single entity where substantive knowledge and 
scientific practice are different facets when viewed from different perspectives. While 
such facets are useful in describing science and specifying frameworks (e.g. DfE, 
2014; NRC, 2012) we must be wary about making divisions in the body of science 
where none exist. The reification of such a division in the past, especially between 
substantive as ‘conceptual’ and practice as ‘process’ has perhaps not been helpful for 
science education.  
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Figure legends / list of captions 
 
Figure 1. A concept map with the focus question “What is the ‘thinking behind the 
doing’ for determining the validity of data?” (Concepts directly informed by 
substantive knowledge are highlighted with a shadow on the box.) 
Figure 2. The set up for Springboard. When the string is cut, the toy figure is 
launched upwards. 
Figure 3. A freshwater stream survey typical of Shrimp. With kind permission of the 
Field Studies Council. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
i
 Other terms are in common usage; for example variables can be referred to as 
factors; the IV and DV being input and output factors. Some descriptions such as ‘the 
thing you measure’ for the DV can be misleading since all variables’ values are 
measured. 
 
ii
 This involves scuffling at a regular intensity for a known period of time in a defined 
area to dislodge organisms from the substrate for collection in a net immediately 
downstream. Some people may consider such a technique to be so disruptive that they 
would not use it – an interesting ethical dimension that should be considered. 
 
iii
 Proxy measures are very important in ‘historical’ sciences, such as geology/earth 
science and in the study of climate change e.g. tree rings and ice cores as proxy 
measures of climate conditions (see Hall, 2010). 
 
iv
 Identification error is a potential threat to the quality of ‘citizen science’ surveys 
and checks on the data are often built into the procedure (Silvertown, 2009).  
 
v
 Non-parametric tests of difference are important for data that are not normally 
distributed. 
 
vi
 Not only by ‘experiment’ – this refers to science’s empirical basis.  
 
 
